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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION AND SCHOOL
FUNDING IN ARKANSAS. Dupree v. Alma School District No. 30, 279
Ark. 340, 651 S.W.2d 90 (1983).
Members of the Arkansas State Board of Education appealed a
Pulaski County Chancery Court decision that the formula distribut-
ing state funds to Arkansas school districts for the operation of their
primary and secondary schools' and their vocational-technical
1. The School Finance Act of 1979, 1979 Ark. Acts 1100, sets out the formula by which
Arkansas' Minimum Foundation Program is distributed. Each school district is eligible to
receive "base aid" and may be eligible to receive equalization aid under this act. For the
base aid appropriation each district is guaranteed the amount of base aid it received in 1978-
79 plus a sum calculated by multiplying the previous year's base aid appropriation by the
ratio of the previous year's average daily membership (ADM) to the second previous year's
ADM. The ADM is calculated by dividing the sum of the daily enrollments for the first
three-quarters of the year by the number of school days during the first three-quarters of the
year in each school district. Districts with an ADM of less than 350 receive an adjustment,
although there is a maximupi of 350 ADM for such districts.
Under Act 1100 all money appropriated must first be used to pay base aid, then provi-
sions for an emergency hardship fund, appropriations for isolated districts and the Depart-
ment of Corrections School District, and incentives for consolidation. All funds remaining
are paid in equalization aid. Equalization aid is paid through two formulas. First, one-half
of all available equalization funds are paid by dividing that total by the state total ADM.
The quotient obtained is paid to each district per its ADM.
The other half of equalization aid is paid to districts according to their resource deter-
mination rate. This figure is obtained by first dividing the state total property assessment by
each county's total property assessment. This index number is then multiplied by the total
state assessed valuation (consisting of all real and personal property, utilities and carriers,
and mineral lease valuations). This figure is the county-charged assessed valuation; how-
ever, this figure cannot be less than 90% nor more than 125% of each county's actual assess-
ment. Then each district's charged assessed valuation is computed by its proportion of
actual county assessed valuation for each county in which it operates.
Each district's charged assessed valuation is then (1) multiplied by forty-five mills
which product is (2) added to the previous year's adjusted base aid which sum is (3) divided
by the previous year's ADM. This figure is the district resource determination rate.
The districts are ranked according to their resource determination rate with the highest
being 100%. The remaining one-half of equalization aid is paid out so that the district occu-
pying the fifth percentile receives four times the amount of the district at the ninety-fifth
percentile, and all other districts receive aid in proportion to that ratio. In addition,
$2,000,000 was appropriated in 1979-80 and 1980-81 to be added to those districts with the
lowest resource determination rates so that "all participating districts will have the same
'resource rate'."
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schools2 violated the state constitution's equal protection3 and pub-
lic education4 provisions. The appellees, eleven school districts,5
contended that the amount of money available to each school dis-
trict under the formula was a function of the valuation of property
within the district. Since the current financing scheme did not suffi-
ciently account for the varied property values across the state, per
pupil expenditures among the districts varied to a degree that vio-
lated the state constitution.6
The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor's holding
concluding that there was no legitimate state purpose to support the
acts in question and that the financing system bore no rational rela-
tionship to the needs of the schoolchildren in each district. Even if
each district was able to meet minimal constitutional educational
requirements, the constitution still demanded equal educational op-
2. Act of April 11, 1975, 1975 Ark. Acts 1004, provides for state funding for voca-
tional-technical schools. Section 1 appropriates $12,500,000 for fiscal years 1975-76 through
1976-77 for this purpose, and section 7 provides, in pertinent part, that the funds, "shall not
be used to supplant existing Federal funds for secondary vocational education programs, but
may be used to increase support of existing programs. The Vocational Division of the State
Department of Education shall, pursuant to regulations of the State Board for Vocational
Education, reimburse school districts for the cost of secondary vocational education pro-
grams, at not less than fifty percent (50%) of the cost of said programs."
3. ARK. CONST. art. II, §§ 2, 3, 18. Section 2 provides: "All men are created equally
free and independent, and have certain inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which are
those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; of acquiring, possessing and protecting
property and reputation, and of pursuing their own happiness. To secure these rights the
governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the
governed."
Section 3 provides: "The equality of all persons before the law is recognized, and shall
ever remain inviolate; nor shall any citizen ever be deprived of any right, privilege or immu-
nity, nor exempted from any burden or duty, on account of race, color or previous condi-
tion."
Section 18 provides: "The General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen or class of
citizens privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all
citizens."
4. ARK. CONST. of 1874, art. xiv, § 1 (1968) provides:
Intelligence and virtue being the safeguards of liberty and the bulwark of a free
and good government, the State shall ever maintain a general, suitable and efficient
system of free public schools and shall adopt all suitable means to secure to the
people the advantages and opportunities of education. The specific intention of
this amendment is to authorize that in addition to existing constitutional or statu-
tory provisions the General Assembly and/or public school districts may spend
public funds for the education of persons over twenty-one (21) years of age and
under six (6) years of age, as may be provided by law, and no other interpretation
shall be given to it.
5. The school districts were Alma, Mulberry, Van Buren, Conway, Lake Hamilton,
Sheridan, Paris, Cabot, Bryant, Greenwood, and Mansfield.
6. ARK. CONST. art. II, §§ 2, 3, 18; art. XIV, § 1. See supra notes 3 and 4.
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portunity. The court further concluded that court ordered statewide
property reassessment7 would not solve the inequity. Finally, the
state was ordered to devise a more equitable formula, since it bore
ultimate responsibility for public education. Dupree v. Alma School
District No. 30, 279 Ark. 340, 651 S.W.2d 90 (1983).
The question in Dupree, whether a state school funding
formula based on local property values violates state equal protec-
tion guarantees, presented the opportunity for the Arkansas
Supreme Court to interpret its own constitutional equal protection
provisions independently8 of a challenge under the fourteenth
amendment of the United States Constitution.9 The state courts'
rulings on this issue have followed the equal protection analysis de-
veloped by the United States Supreme Court.'0 Thus it is helpful to
examine the basic features of that analysis.
The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution
was ratified in 1868 in order to vest the protection given to Blacks by
the Civil Rights Act in 1866" in the Constitution. 12 The equal pro-
7. Public Service Commission v. Pulaski County Equalization Board, 266 Ark. 64, 582
S.W.2d 942 (1979) (all property values across the state must be reassessed to reflect current
market value).
8. In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), the
United States Supreme Court stated that education did not merit heightened review under
equal protection analysis and that the Texas school funding system met the requirements of
the rational relationship standard of review. See infra text accompanying notes 56 to 69.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, provides in part that "No State shall. . . deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
10. The California Supreme Court stated that is equal protection guarantees were "sub-
stantially the equivalent" of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Ser-
rano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 764, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345, 366, 557 P.2d 929, 949 (1977). Other
states have applied two or three tier analyses that parallel the federal model. See, e.g., Lujan
v. Colorado State Board of Education, 649 P.2d 1005, 1014 (Colo. 1982); Horton v. Meskill,
172 Conn. 615, 639, 376 A.2d 359, 370-71 (1977); McDaniel v. Thomas, 248 Ga. 632, 647,
285 S.E.2d 156, 166-67 (1981); Board of Educ., Levittown Union Free School Dist. v. Ny-
quist, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 42, 439 N.E.2d 359, 365, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643, 650 (1982); Board of Educ.
of City School District of City of Cincinnati v. Walter, 58 Ohio St.2d 368, 373, 390 N.E.2d
813, 817 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980); Olsen v. State, 276 Or. 9, 15-16, 554 P.2d
139, 145 (1976); Northshore School Dist. No. 417 v. Kinnear, 84 Wash. 2d 685, 725, 530 P.2d
178, 198 (1974), overruled in part by Seattle School Dist. v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 585 P.2d
71 (1978); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 864 (W.Va. 1979); Washakie County School Dist.
No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 333 (Wyo. 1980) cert. denied sub norm, Hot Springs
County School Dist. No. One v. Washakie County School Dist. No. One, 449 U.S. 824
(1980). But see Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 802, 537 P.2d 635, 645 (1975) (Idaho
never adopted strict scrutiny standard of review for equal protection analysis).
11. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1982, 1987-92 (1976 & Supp. 1981)).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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tection provisions of the amendment13 were designed to protect
Blacks in the post-Civil War South from discriminatory state legis-
lation. 14 However, the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment is not construed to bar all state discrimination,15 since it
is recognized that a state can classify its residents through its police
power in support of legitimate state interests. 6 Generally, great def-
erence is accorded state legislatures in exercising this function,17 but
certain classifications are subject to more rigorous review by the
Court.' 8 Today, three levels or standards of review are recognized in
the Court's analysis of discriminatory legislation. 9
The Supreme Court requires that legislative distinctions must
have a "fair and substantial relation to the object of the legisla-
tion."2 In addition, facially impartial legislation must be applied
equally.2' Nor may legislation invidiously discriminate between
persons in similar circumstances. 22  This rational relationship stan-
13. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
14. K. STAMPP, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION, 1865-1877 135-138 (1965); H. HYMAN,
A MORE PERFECT UNION: THE IMPACT OF THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION ON THE
CONSTITUTION 466-68 (1975).
15. See, e.g., Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts, 410 U.S. 356, 359 (1973) (uphold-
ing amendment to state constitution which prohibited taxation on individual personal prop-
erty but allowed taxation of corporate personal property).
16. See, e.g., Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (state could
prohibit advertising for hire on delivery trucks to reduce distractions to urban pedestrian
and vehicle traffic); Gulf, C. & S. F.R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 155 (1897) (fourteenth
amendment does not withhold from states the power of classification, though such classifica-
tion must not be made arbitrarily).
17. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961) (fourteenth amendment
permits the states a wide scope of discretion in enacting laws which affect some groups of
citizens differently than others).
18. New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
19. See generally Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term, Foreword In Search of
Evolwng Doctrine on a Changing Court." A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1972); Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197 (1976); Fox, Equal
Protection Analysis." Laurence Tribe, The Middle Tier, and the Role of the Court, 14 U.S.F.L.
REV. 525 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Fox].
20. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
21. Facially impartial legislation does not draw impermissible classifications solely by
the language of the statute. However, it may do so by application of the statute. See, e.g.,
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (ordinance prohibiting operation of laundries
housed in wooden buildings held unconstitutional because most laundries of this type were
owned by Chinese residents while most other laundries were owned by non-Chinese
residents).
22. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) (regulations applicable
only to opticians but not optometrists or opthamologists held valid because the two classes
were dissimilar and the equal protection clause prohibits only invidious discrimination);
Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (trucks advertising for hire were
in a dissimilar situation than trucks advertising their owner's goods and services).
1983] SCHOOL FUNDING 545
dard is the minimal equal protection test that challenged legislation
must pass. It is based on a court's deference to legislative expertise,
resulting in a presumption of constitutionality, 23 and requires only
that the classification at issue be rational in relation to a legitimate
public purpose.24
The Court applies a higher standard of review when legislation
affects fundamental rights25 or burdens a suspect class.26 Under this
strict scrutiny standard, legislation is not accorded a presumption of
constitutionality, and the state must demonstrate a compelling pur-
pose to justify the classification.27 The state must also show that the
legislation is narrowly tailored to fit its objectives and that no less
restrictive methods are available.2" Suspect classes have been iden-
tified in legislation based on race,29 alienage,30 or national origin.3'
23. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (where state put a ceiling on wel-
fare benefits regardless of household size it was held that the fourteenth amendment gives
federal courts no power to impose upon the states their views of what constitutes wise eco-
nomic or social policy); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961) (state has wide
scope of discretion in deciding what products could and could not be sold on Sunday).
24. Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 485; Williamson, 348 U.S. 483; Railway Express Agency, 336
U.S. 106. See also United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174
(1980) (any conceivable rational relationship will suffice (citing Lindsley v. National Car-
bonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911)).
25. Fundamental rights are those rights "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Con-
stitution." San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973).
See infra text accompanying notes 63 to 66.
26. Suspect classes are "discrete and insular minorities," Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (citing United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-153
n.4 (1938)), and are characterized by "a history of purposeful unequal treatment" or "polit-
ical powerlessness" or an immutable characteristic. Rodrigiuez, 411 U.S. at 28. See also
Note, Quasi-Suspect Classes and Proof of Discriminatory Intent: A New Model, 90 YALE L.J.
912, 917-18 (1980).
27. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (state one-year residency require-
ment for welfare benefits required a showing of state's compelling interest since it inhibited
interstate travel, a fundamental right); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 (1972) (state
must demonstrate a compelling interest to justify residency requirement for voting
eligibility).
28. Dunn, 405 U.S. at 343 (state voting residency requirement, while protecting impor-
tant state interests, was not valid since the state could not demonstrate that no less drastic
means existed to fulfill the objective); Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 634.
29. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (state antimiscegenation statute); Boiling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (racially segregated schools in District of Columbia violated
equal protection).
30. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (state law denying welfare benefits to
aliens in order to maintain fiscal integrity was not based on a compelling interest). But see
Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (state may deny employment as a public school
teacher to aliens); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (federal government may deny gov-
ernment medical insurance program to aliens because Congress is given power over immi-
gration and naturalization by the Constitution).
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Legislation which burdens a fundamental right32 is also strictly scru-
tinized. The right to vote, 33 the right to interstate travel, 34 and the
right of choice in intimate personal matters35 have been identified as
fundamental for purposes of equal protection analysis; however,
economic interests are not fundamental rights.36 The key to discov-
ering fundamental rights lies not in the social importance of an as-
serted right, but in whether it is "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed
by the Constitution. 37
The Court has expressly recognized an intermediate standard
of review, falling between the rational relationship and strict scru-
tiny standards. 38 The salient feature of this standard of review is the
addition of a means-oriented branch of analysis. Under the two-tier
model, once it was determined that the purpose of classificatory leg-
islation was legitimate, that is, that it did not affect a fundamental
right or a suspect class, then almost any set of facts was sufficient to
show that the means was rationally related to the asserted state pur-
pose.3 9 Conversely, if the strict scrutiny standard was found to ap-
ply, almost no set of facts could be found to justify the legislation.4
31. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (state law prohibiting ownership of land
by citizen who was the son of a resident alien held violative of equal protection guarantees).
32. See supra note 25.
33. Dunn, 405 U.S. 330 (a one-year residency requirement for voting eligibility held
invalid); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (right to vote held too
important to be conditioned upon payment of a state poll tax).
34. Shapiro, 394 U.S. 618 (a one-year residency requirement for welfare benefits bur-
dens right to interstate travel). But see Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S.
250, 256 (1974) (Shaprio did not declare such requirements to be per se unconstitutional;
only where legislation penalizes exercise of right to interstate travel does strict scrutiny ap-
ply). See also Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) (state court jurisdictional requirement of
one-year residency in divorce action upheld because relief sought was not absolutely denied
and state had sufficient interest in requiring indications of appellant's intent to remain in the
state before it exercised control over her legal relations).
35. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (Texas criminal abortion statute, except-
ing criminality only for life-saving abortions, held unconstitutional invasion of appellant's
personal right to choose whether or not to have a child); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942) (state law authorizing sterilization of persons convicted twice of crimes involving
moral turpitude, except for embezzlers, struck down under strict scrutiny).
36. Dandridge, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (state statute setting upper limit to federal welfare
assistance based on number of family members held valid under rational relationship
standard).
37. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 33.
38. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (where state law set minimum drinking age
at 21 for males and 18 for females, the classification was held not to be substantially related
to the important state objective of traffic safety). See also Fox, supra note 19.
39. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Railway Express Agency
v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
40. The strict scrutiny standard was said to be "strict" in theory, but "fatal" in fact.
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The intermediate standard, in contrast, combines a determina-
tion of the legitimacy of state objectives which an honest attempt to
assess the rationality of the relationship between the means and the
objectives of the legislation.4 Classifications subject to intermediate
review must "serve important government objectives and must be
substantially related to achievement of those objectives. ' 42 This
standard has been applied where a classification is based on gen-
der,43 and upon the unique fact situation of Ply/er v. Doe.44
Equal protection challenges to school funding acts began in the
late 1960's. The basic contention by the plaintiffs in these cases was
that these acts violated equal protection guarantees of schoolchil-
dren, taxpayers, or both,45 since the total revenue available to a dis-
trict was a function of the value of the property within the district,
which usually varied considerably. At the time these suits were
brought, every state except Hawaii financed their school systems
through this combination of state and local taxation.46 Ironically,
most of these funding schemes were derived from the original efforts
of New York educators in 1923 to develop a funding system which
would ensure "equal educational facilities . . . at a uniform rate
throughout the state in terms of the burden of taxation. 47 The New
York scheme combined equalization and local incentive by guaran-
teeing a minimum expenditure per pupil to each district if they
would tax at a minimum rate. If the revenue raised thereby failed to
meet the guaranteed minimum, the state would make up the differ-
Gunther, supra note 19, at 8. But see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (state
was able to show compelling interest in discriminating against persons of Japanese descent,
because of feared Japanese invasion of West Coast during World War Two).
41. Fox, supra note 19, at 567-68.
42. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 197.
43. Id.
44. In Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), the United States Supreme Court applied the
intermediate standard to the question of whether a state could withhold funding from school
districts that enrolled illegal aliens. While it was noted that education was not a fundamen-
tal right, the Court recognized that "neither is it merely some governmental 'benefit' indis-
tinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation." 457 U.S. at 221. The question
remains whether legislation touching an educational interest or an illegal alien class would
independently trigger the Court's use of the intermediate standard. See, The Supreme Court
1981 Term, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 134 (1982).
45. See, e.g., Shofstall v. Hollins, 110 Ariz. 88, 89, 515 P.2d 590, 593 (1973); Northshore
530 P.2d at 181.
46. Coons, Clune, and Sugarman, Educational Opportunity. A Workable Constitutional
Testfor State Financial Structures, 57 CAL. L. REV. 305, 312 (1969).
47. J. CooNs, W. CLUNE, AND S. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCA-
TION 63-64 (1970) (quoting G. STRAYER AND R. HAIG, FINANCING OF EDUCATION IN THE
STATE OF NEW YORK 173 (1923)).
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ence. Otherwise, any amount the local district taxed above the min-
imum could be spent on its schools as the district pleased.48 Because
of the difference in value of different types of land, the amount of
money raised by the same millage would vary from district to dis-
trict. Conversely, it would take a higher millage to raise a certain
amount of money in a property poor district than it would in a
richer district.49
The first cases to challenge these funding formulas under equal
protection analysis appeared in federal district courts in Illinois and
Virginia." In McInnis v. Shapiro"' the Illinois system was chal-
lenged as not being rational since expenditure was not based on the
"needs" of the various districts. The district court ruled that no
cause of action was stated due to the non-justiciability of the issue.52
The court disputed the plaintiffs' assumption that educational
"needs" could be realistically translated into monetary terms, at
least in comparing one district's needs with those of another. Con-
sequently, it refused to rule on the merits of the issue due to the lack
of judicial standards.53 Concerning the constitutional issue, the
court concluded that the legislation met the requirements of the ra-
tional relationship standard due to the legislature's desire to allow
local districts to determine their own tax rate in proportion to the
importance they placed on education. 4 In 1969 a district court in
Virginia agreed with the rationale behind Mclnnis adding that "the
courts have neither the knowledge, nor the means, nor the power to
tailor public moneys [to fit school needs]. ' '55
In 1973 the United States Supreme Court seemingly foreclosed
further atacks on school funding acts under the strict scrutiny stan-
dard by its decision in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez.5 6 The five member majority applied the rational rela-
tionship standard of equal protection analysis and because neither a
suspect class nor a fundamental right was involved, reversed a lower
court holding that strict scrutiny of the funding system was
48. Id. at 64. This type of program is often called the Minimum Foundation Program.
49. Eg., Horton, 376 A.2d at 367.
50. Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. IUI. 1968), af'd sub nom, Mclnnis v.
Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969); Burruss v. Wilkerson, 310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969).
51. 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. IUl. 1968).
52. Id. at 329.
53. Id. at 335-36.
54. Id. at 333.
55. Burruss, 310 F. Supp. at 574.




First, the Court distinguished Rodriguez from other cases
where wealth was a factor in creating a suspect class58 by noting that
the deprivation in Rodriguez was relative, not absolute.5 9 The com-
plaining schoolchildren in Rodriguez were receiving an education
that at least met the minimal requirements of the Texas constitu-
tion. 60 Further, the injured class could not be adequately defined
since there was little correlation between district wealth and the per-
sonal wealth of the district's inhabitants. 6I Nor did the injured class
have any of the indicia of suspectness: a history of purposeful une-
qual treatment or political powerlessness.62
The Court also declared that it was wrong to assume that fun-
damental rights were discerned by "the importance of a service per-
formed by the State. 63 The proper test was "whether there is a right
to education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion."'  In addition, education was not made a fundamental right
by its impact on an individual's ability to speak and vote.65 While
the Court was willing to gurantee those rights, it declared it would
not guarantee an individual's right to the most effective develop-
ment of the ability to exercise those rights.66
In applying the rational relationship standard, the Court noted
that the judiciary should not interfere with a legislature's economic
distribution function unnecessarily, and that "[n]o scheme of taxa-
tion, . . . ,has yet been devised which is free of all discriminatory
impact. '67 It also questioned, as did McInnis v. Shapiro, the validity
of assuming a high correlation between expenditure and educational
quality.68 Finally, it found that the Texas formula furthered the le-
gitimate state interest of fostering local control of public schools.69
As a result of Rodriguez, plaintiffs challenging school funding
57. 411 U.S. at 17-18.
58. See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (denial of free transcript to indigent
defendant on appeal of right); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (denial of free
counsel to indigent defendant on appeal of right).
59. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 19.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 26-27.
62. Id. at 28.
63. Id. at 30.
64. Id. at 33.
65. Id. at 35.
66. Id. at 36.
67. Id. at 40.
68. Id. at 43.
69. Id. at 55. Accord Mclnnis, 293 F. Supp. at 335-36.
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acts began to seek relief from state courts. Serrano v. Priest70 was
the first case to rule on the constitutionality of such acts under a
state constitution. It also ruled on the issue under the fourteenth
amendment since the issue had not yet been decided by Rodriguez.
Without the aid of Rodriguez's guidelines in discerning fundamental
rights,7 the Serrano I court concluded that education was a funda-
mental right under both the United States and California constitu-
tional because (1) it was a determinant "of an individual's chances
for economic and social success;" (2) because it influenced an indi-
vidual's development as a citizen; and (3) because the United States
Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka had de-
clared that educational opportunity, "where the state has under-
taken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on
equal terms."72 Having decided to strictly scrutinize California's
funding formula, the court held that attempting to preserve local
control of school districts was not a sufficient justification,7 3 since
centralized financing would not necessarily deprive school boards of
meaningful power.74 Also, for poorer districts the notion of local
control over tax millages was an illusion since they were already
taxed to their constituent's limits. 75 Finally, because education was
unique among public services, there was no need to fear equal pro-
tection challenges to inequities in other local services, such as fire or
police protection.76
Rodriguez, of course, cast doubt on Serrano I's holding con-
cerning the fourteenth amendment and its method of determining
fundamental rights. Thus, relying on the dicta in Rodriguez,77
courts in Michigan,78 West Virginia, 79 and Wyoming8" found that
70. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241 (1971). [hereinafter cited as Serrano
I].
71. See supra text accompanying notes 63 to 66.
72. Serrano 1, 487 P.2d at 1255-57 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493
(1954)).
73. Id. at 1260.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1263.
77. 411 U.S. at 33 (fundamental rights are those explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by
the Constitution).
78. Milliken v. Green, 389 Mich. 1, 27, 203 N.W.2d 457, 468-69 (1972). However, in
Milliken v. Green, 390 Mich. 389, 212 N.w.2d 711 (1973), the Michigan court reversed itself
and, accepting the Mclnnis rationale, declared that since there was no standard by which
equality in education could be measured, it "could not responsibly declare the present sys-
tem of financing schools unconstitutional." 212 N.W.2d at 719-20.
79. Pauley, 255 S.E.2d 859.
80. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310.
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the explicit provisions for education in their state constitutions indi-
cated that education was a fundamental right. The California
Supreme Court followed a similar rationale in Serrano v. Priest,8
which challenged the funding system as amended in response to Ser-
rano I solely under California's equal protection provisions. These
cases held that no compelling end was shown by the state to justify
its classification based on wealth,82 or that the state had not shown
that less restrictive means were not available to achieve its
objectives.
83
At the same time, some courts disputed the Rodriguez test84 for
fundamental rights, at least as applied to their constitutions. 85
These courts generally held that the rational relationship standard
was the proper one to apply and in so doing found that local control
was a legitimate state interest supporting the challenged legisla-
tion. 86 Additionally, some courts upholding the constitutionality of
their funding systems implied that the outcome of the case rested
partly on the inability of courts to convert educational "needs" into
empirical data, for the purpose of comparing educational opportu-
nities between districts.87
81. 18 Cal. 3d 728, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345, 557 P.2d 929 (1977), cert. den. sub nom, Clowes v.
Serrano, 432 U.S. 907 (1977). [hereinafter cited as Serrano HI]. The court in Serrano I1 did
not adopt the Rodriguez test but held that education was a fundamental right because it
went to the "core of a free and representative form of government." 557 P.2d at 952. Accord
Horton, 376 A.2d at 373.
82. See Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 878; Horton, 376 A.2d at 371; Milliken, 203 N.W.2d at
470.
83. See, e.g., Herschler, 606 P.2d at 335.
84. See supra note 77.
85. See, e.g., Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973) (the right to hold
property is guaranteed by the federal Constitution but is not likely to be accorded such
preferred treatment). Accord Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d at 645; Olsen v. State, 276
Or. 9, 554 P.2d 139, 144 (1976) (Rodriguez would make Oregon's constitutional guarantee of
the right to sell and serve liquor a fundamental right). See also Lujan, 649 P.2d at 1017;
Walter, 390 N.E.2d at 818-19 (state constitutions are not documents of limited power, thus
some provisions of the constitution are merely legislative mandates); McDaniel v. Thomas,
248 Ga. 632, 647, 285 S.E.2d 156, 167 (1981) (Rodriguez, if not controlling, is persuasive
authority for the proposition that education is not a fundamental right under the Georgia
Constitution); Nyquirt, 439 N.E.2d at 365 (Rodriguez controls, citing Matter of Levy, 38
N.Y.2d 653, 658, 345 N.E.2d 556, 558 382 N.Y.S.2d 13, 15 (1976)). See generally Morgan,
Fundamental State Rights: .4 New Basisfor Strict Scrutiny in Federal Equal Protection Re-
view, 17 GA. L. REv. 77, 97-99 (1982).
86. See Lujan, 649 P.2d at 1023; Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d at 366; Walter, 390 N.E.2d at 820.
Cf. Olsen, 554 P.2d at 145 (court must weigh detriment to children against justification
offered by state); Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d at 282 (ultimately court must decide whether
state action is arbitrary). See also Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d at 645 (Idaho never
adopted the strict scrutiny test).
87. See, e.g., Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d at 642; Milliken 212 N.W.2d at 719.
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However, some courts have used the criteria set out in their
constitutional education provisions as the standard of judicial re-
view, rather than traditional equal protection criteria. The New
Jersey Supreme Court found that education was not a fundamental
right but that a "thorough and efficient" education was mandated
by the state's constitution.8" Arizona, on the other hand, found edu-
cation to be a fundamental right but held that "rational and reason-
able" educational standards were all that were required within that
right.89 In another case, the Georgia Supreme Court held that it was
impossible to tell whether education was a fundamental right under
their state constitution, but that the absence of an affirmative duty to
equalize educational spending in the constitution's education article
was constitutionally significant. 90 Other courts looked to the legisla-
tive history of their constitutional education provisions and found
that there was no requirement of equality of expenditure.9 '
Against this background came the challenge to school funding
in Arkansas. Like most other states, Arkansas depends on a combi-
nation of state and local money to finance its schools. Originally,
revenue came from federal land grants in support of education,92
but by 1874 school revenues were derived from a permanent school
fund which remained from the land grants, a two mill statewide
property tax, a one dollar poll tax, and local property taxes not ex-
ceeding five mills. Apportionment of these funds was based on each
district's share of each county's juvenile population.93 Between 1875
and 1926 local districts carried much of the burden of school financ-
ing and various constitutional amendments increased the permissi-
88. Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d at 294 (education is not a fundamental right but the
inequities in the funding system violate a constitutional mandate that the school system be
"thorough and efficient").
89. Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d at 592 (education is a fundamental right but if the
school system meets constitutional mandate that it be free, uniform, open six months per
year and available to anyone aged six to twenty-one then the system need only be rational
and reasonable).
90. McDaniel 285 S.E.2d at 166 (funding system held constitutional since it sought to
promote local control).
91. Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d at 649 (education article drafted so that school
funding need not be based exclusively on local taxation); Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d at 367 (educa-
tion article sought to assure statewide minimal acceptable facilities and services). Accord
Walter, 390 N.E.2d at 825 (equal protection and education clauses are not mutually sup-
portive; education clause only requires that districts meet minimal standards); Olsen, 554
P.2d at 148; Northshore, 530 P.2d at 201 (that school districts vary in size and taxable prop-
erty does not signify that the system of public schools is neither general nor uniform).
92. Dial, Historical Development of School Finance in Arkansas, 1819-1970 59-60
(1971) (Ed.D. dissertation, University of Arkansas).
93. Id. at 160.
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ble local millage rate to eighteen mills. 94  Finally, in 1947 the
statewide real property tax in support of education was removed
and in 1948 amendment forty to the Arkansas Constitution removed
all millage restrictions from local school taxes. 95 Arkansas' version
of the Minimum Foundation Program (MFP)96 was first imple-
mented in 195 197 and has been reformulated at various times, con-
cluding in the present act.98
In 1978 state revenues provided about fifty-two percent of the
total school revenue in Arkansas and local revenues about thirty-
eight percent. The remaining ten percent came from federal
sources. 99 In that same year seventy-seven percent of state aid was
distributed through the MFP. °° Under the current formula, 10 ' each
district receives a specified amount of money per pupil based on the
district's daily school membership. 0 2 Once this "base aid" and
other stipulated appropriations are paid, the remainder of the MFP
appropriation is paid out in "equalization aid" based on a district's
level of financial resources, namely the property valuation in the
district."0 3 For 1979-80 equalization aid amounted to 6.8% of the
MFP program."° In addition, funding on a per pupil basis was held
at the 1978-79 level, 05 regardless of the changing fortunes of the
district, although the total amount a district may receive would de-
pend on the enrollment from year to year. °0 Because school districts
could supplement their state aid by taxing local property, per pupil
revenues varied widely in the state, from $2,378 to $873 in 1978-79.
In addition, the assessed property valuation per pupil that year
ranged from $73,773 to $1,853.107 The appellees in Dupree also
challenged state aid to vocational-technical schools.' 0 8  Since the
state would fund only existing vocational-technical programs,"° it
94. Id. at 161, 270-71.
95. Id. at 511. ARK. CONST. amend. 40.
96. See supra note 48.
97. The Arkansas Minimum School Budget, Law, 1951 Ark. Acts 278.
98. The School Finance Act of 1979, 1979 Ark. Acts 1100.
99. Dupree v. Alma School District No. 30, 279 Ark. 340, 343, 651 S.W.2d 90, 91 (1983).
100. Id.
101. See supra note 1.
102. 1979 Ark. Acts 1100, § 2(J).
103. 1979 Ark. Acts 1100, § 3(B).
104. 279 Ark. at 344, 651 S.W.2d at 92.
105. 1979 Ark. Acts 1100 § 2(1)(1).
106. 1979 Ark. Acts 1100, § 2(J).
107. 279 Ark. at 344, 651 S.W.2d at 92.
108. Id. at 343, 651 S.W.2d at 92.
109. 1975 Ark. Acts 1004, § 7.
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was claimed that poorer districts were denied the benefit of state aid
since they could not raise the money necessary to establish a voca-
tional-technical program." 10
In affirming the chancellor's ruling, the Arkansas Supreme
Court held that the equal protection and education provisions in the
state constitution complemented each other.' In applying the
equal protection provisions, however, the court found it unnecessary
to answer the question of whether education was a fundamental
right in Arkansas." 2 Since the amount of funding was based on
local property valuations it bore no rational relationship to a dis-
trict's needs," 13 "as reflected by staff, class size, curriculum, remedial
services, facilities, materials and equipment."'" 4 Since the funding
acts did not account for the needs of the school districts in determin-
ing disbursements, there was no constitutional basis for them and
the challenged legislation failed regardless of which standard of re-
view was applied.' Nevertheless, it is significant that the majority
stressed the importance of education by quoting from the Arkansas
Constitution as follows: "Intelligence and virtue being the safe-
guards of liberty and bulwark [sic] of a free and good government,
the State shall ever maintain a general, suitable and efficient system
of free public schools ... and by stating their own belief that
"the right to equal educational opportunity is basic to our
society."'
The Arkansas court relied on Serrano I to dispense with the
appellant's contention that the preservation of local control of
school systems was a legitimate goal of the legislation." 18 The court
noted that equalization of financing did not "dictate that local con-
110. 279 Ark. at 344, 651 S.W.2d at 92.
111. Id.; accord Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 878.
112. 279 Ark. at 346, 651 S.W.2d at 93.
113. Id. at 344, 651 S.W.2d at 92.
114. Id.; accordHorton, 376 A.2d at 368. Contra Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 43; Thompson v.
Engelking, 537 P.2d at 641; Milliken, 212 N.W.2d at 719 (underlying the decisions of these
courts was the premise that equality in educational opportunity cannot be determined
merely by comparing relative expenditure in certain key categories).
115. Dupree, 279 Ark. at 345, 651 S.W.2d at 93.
116. Id. at 346, 651 S.W.2d at 93 (quoting ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 1).
117. Id.; cf. Serrano HI, 557 P.2d at 952 (Cal. 1977). "In applying our state constitu-
tional provisions guaranteeing equal protection of the laws we shall continue to apply strict
and searching judicial scrutiny to legislative classifications which, because of their impact on
those individual rights and liberties which lie at the core of our free and representative form
of government, are properly considered fundamental."
118. 279 Ark. at 346, 651 S.W.2d at 93.
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trol must be reduced,"' ' 9 and that control over tax rates was illusory
for poor districts since they had to tax at high levels just to maintain
their levels of service.' The appellant's argument that the state
constitution only required that each district provide a suitable basic
education was dismissed because "[b]are and minimal sufficiency
does not translate into equal educational opportunity."' 2' Further,
statewide property reassessment 22 would not solve the inequity be-
cause the gap between rich and poor districts would still exist.
123
Finally, the court noted that the legislature must rectify the situation
since the state has the ultimate responsibility for maintenance of the
education system.
24
It is difficult to determine which standard of review the Arkan-
sas Supreme Court applied in Dupree. Justice Purtle noted in his
concurring opinion that the court did not declare education to be a
fundamental right under the Arkansas Constitution, 25 thus trigger-
ing strict scrutiny of the legislative scheme. Yet it is equally clear
that the Arkansas court went further than the cursory examination
usually afforded social and economic legislation. 126 Indicative of
the court's willingness to go beyond a perfunctory examination of
the legislation is its characterization of education as "the essential
prerequisite that allows our citizens to be able to appreciate, claim
and effectively realize their established rights."'127 Such language is
reminiscent of Brown v. Board of Education,28 where it was noted
that education "is the very foundation of good citizenship,"'' 29 and
where made available, "is a right which must be made available to
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 347, 651 S.W.2d at 93.
122. Arkansas Public Service Commission v. Pulaski County Bd. of Equalization, 266
Ark. 64, 582 S.W.2d 942 (1979).
123. Dupree, 279 Ark. at 347, 651 S.W.2d at 93.
124. Id. at 349, 651 S.W.2d at 95.
125. Id. at 349, 651 S.W.2d at 97 (Purtle, J., concurring). The court thus refused to fol-
low Serrano II, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345, 557 P.2d 929, Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376
A.2d 359 (1977), and Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W.Va. 1979), on this issue.
126. See, e.g., Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (where legisla-
ture sought to diminish street advertising thought to be distracting to motorists, legislature
could have concluded that business vehicles displaying advertising from other businesses for
profit was more distracting than business vehicles advertising their own products or serv-
ices). See also United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980) (it was
constitutionally irrelevant whether Congress in fact considered the purported justification in
support of legislative classification if the justification was reasonable).
127. Dupree, 279 Ark. at 346, 651 S.W.2d at 93.
128. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
129. Id. at 493.
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all on equal terms."' 130
In Dupree the exercise of this more extensive review of the
school funding acts is also explained by article XIV, section 1 of the
Arkansas Constitution.' 3' This section places on the legislature the
burden of meeting Arkansas' educational needs. In concert with the
language of article II, sections 2, 3, and 18, these needs must be met
equally for all citizens. Thus, this situation differs from a review of
purely economic legislation, in which case the legislature is able to
set its own standards. Here, the legislature must meet the mandated
standards of article XIV, section 1132 and provide for Arkansas' edu-
cational needs. Coupled with the equal protection provisions, the
legislation purporting to satisfy the education mandate must be ana-
lyzed to see if indeed it is fulfilling that mandate. In Dupree the
justification of local control did not assist in meeting the needs of all
Arkansas school children equally. It was therefore unrelated to the
true purpose of the funding statute, which was to satisfy the consti-
tution's education article.
What direction, then, did the court give the legislature in refor-
mulating the funding system, especially in light of its declaration
that it will not undertake a search for tax equity, a job for which it
believes the legislature is better suited. 33 At least one justice stated
that he could not justify any formula that did not distribute funds
on a per pupil basis, 34 though such a system demands that school
districts be the same size, with reapportionment taking place at spec-
ified intervals. 35 Even then, guidelines would have to be estab-
lished to compensate for the varying costs of similar services across
the state, for example, between rural and urban areas.
Another approach to the problem would be the elimination of
the disparities in district needs, which is the focus of Dupree.'36 This
approach would require (1) identification of a district's needs, (2) a
decision as to whether such needs can be rectified by additional
money, and (3) arranging those needs in order of priority.
A third alternative is to modify the current scheme, which does
not seem facially defective, given the equalization provision in the
act. Yet because of the requirement that 1978-79 funding levels be
130. Id.
131. See supra note 4.
132. Id.
133. Dupree, 279 Ark. at 349-50, 651 S.W.2d at 95 (quoting Serrano I, 557 P.2d at 946).
134. Id. at 351, 651 S.W.2d at 96 (Hickman, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 352, 651 S.W.2d at 96-97 (Hickman, J., concurring).
136. Id. at 342, 345, 346, 651 S.W.2d at 91, 93.
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maintained (the hold-harmless provision), 137 and the priority given
to other specific appropriations, equalization aid accounted for only
6.8% of the amount appropriated by the legislature in 1979-80. If
the equalization provision were allowed to operate in practice as it
was intended to in theory, it would ensure that each district would
receive equal funding. Even so, the absence of a cap on local mil-
lage rates would allow property rich districts to continue to generate
more revenue than property poor districts, leaving the scheme still
vulnerable to an equal protection challenge. However, given the
political considerations surrounding education issues, modification
of the present system coupled with a millage cap seems more politi-
cally feasible than statewide consolidation or equalization on the
basis of district needs.
Mark Allison
137. 1979 Ark. Acts 1100, § 1(1). See also Dupree, 279 Ark. at 343, 651 S.W.2d at 92.
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